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RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM—THE IMPACT
OF RESURRECTING AN OLD MORAL
IMPERATIVE ON THE NATIONAL
ORGAN DONATION RATE IN ISRAEL
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AVRAHAM STOLER**
I
INTRODUCTION
Israel’s organ-transplantation history dates back to 1964, when the first
1
kidney transplantation from a living related donor was performed. In 1965, the
first kidney transplantation from a deceased donor was successfully
2
accomplished. Currently six Israeli medical centers perform kidney, heart, lung,
3
and liver transplantations. The Israel National Transplant Center (INTC)
4
coordinates all donors and transplantations. INTC coordinators are in every
5
medical center in the country. Despite this, the deceased-organ-donation rate
in Israel has traditionally been among the lowest in Western countries, ranging
6
between seven and eight deceased donors per million population.
There are numerous past and present causes of the low donation rate. One
major cause is the refusal of some ultraorthodox religious groups to recognize
7
brain death as a valid determination of death. These groups may refuse organ
8
donation from individuals who are brain dead but do not meet other criteria.
Many mainstream rabbis accept brain death as a valid determination of death
Copyright © 2014 by Jacob Lavee and Avraham Stoler.
This article is also available at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
* Associate Professor of Surgery, Sackler Faculty of Medicine, Tel Aviv University, Medical
Doctor, Leviev Heart Center, Sheba Medical Center, Israel.
** Assistant Professor, Driehaus College of Business, DePaul University.
1. ISR. NAT’L TRANSPLANT CENTER, http://www.health.gov.il/Subjects/Organ_transplant/
Israel_transplant_center_ADI/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2014).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Council of Europe, International Figures on Organ Donation and Transplantation Activity—
2010, NEWSLETTER TRANSPLANT, Sept. 2011, at 35, available at http://www.edqm.eu/
medias/fichiers/Newsletter_Transplant_Vol_16_No_1_Sept_2011.pdf.
7. Jonathan Cohen et al., Brain Death Determination in Israel: The First Two Years Experience
Following Changes to the Brain Death Law—Opportunities and Challenges, 12 AM. J.
TRANSPLANTATION 2514, 2514 (2012).
8. Id.
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and consider organ donation one of the highly noble deeds in Judaism.
However, the vocal objection from ultraorthodox rabbis has widespread
consequences since, during critical moments of life, many Israelis, mainly
religious but also secular, seek comfort and advice from various religious
10
leaders and tend to accept their judgment.
An additional cause of the low donation rate is the so-called “free-riding”
behavior of those who reject brain death as a valid determination of death yet
11
are prepared to be organ recipients from brain-dead donors. This phenomenon
spurs resentment to organ donation and is cited in Israeli public-opinion surveys
12
as a major reason for the low consent rate.
Another important cause was, until recently, the relatively inexpensive
availability of transplant tourism for Israeli patients. The Ministry of Health
allows Israeli hospitals to perform kidney transplants only from either living
related or purely altruistic non-designated donors, following approval by special
13
national transplant ethics committees. Candidates for kidney transplantation
who identify fellow Israelis who are willing to sell one of their kidneys are
14
prohibited from undergoing surgery in Israel. Accordingly, instead, many of
them used to travel with their donors to countries such as Turkey, South Africa,
15
Bulgaria, Azerbaijan, or Sri Lanka for the surgery. In the majority of cases,
Israeli transplant tourists received kidneys from foreign paid donors in the
donors’ home countries—mainly the Philippines, but also China and
16
Colombia. Due to a lack of meaningful legal obstacles up to the year 2008,
Israeli insurance companies and sick funds used to incentivize this transplant
tourism by fully reimbursing transplant operations performed abroad regardless
17
of the legality of the operations under local law. These reimbursements were
motivated by both the desire to help desperate patients overcome the local
organ shortage and considerations of economic efficiency as these patients were
18
taken off the costly dialysis list. Moreover, middlemen, who were motivated to
expand the transplant tourism market, have emerged between the donors and
19
the insurance companies or sick funds, thereby exacerbating the problem.
Finally, altruistic organ donation was also traditionally underutilized due to
a variety of disincentives, mainly involving lack of any reimbursement to live
9. ISRAEL NATIONAL TRANSPLANT CENTER, supra note 1.
10. Cohen et al., supra note 7, at 2515–17.
11. Stephanie Eaton, The Subtle Politics of Organ Donation: A Proposal, 24 J. MED. ETHICS 167,
167–68 (1998).
12. Jacob Lavee et al., A New Law for Allocation of Donor Organs in Israel, 375 LANCET 1131,
1131 (2010) [hereinafter Lavee, New Law].
13. Benita Padilla et al., Impact of Legal Measures Prevent Transplant Tourism: The Interrelated
Experience of The Philippines and Israel. 16 MED. HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 915, 916 (2013).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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donors for their incurred expenses and loss of income
In response to all of these obstacles to organ transplantation, on March 31,
2008 the Israeli Parliament passed into legislation two laws relevant to organ
20
transplantation. The laws aim to halt illegal transplant tourism while increasing
local organ donation from both deceased and living donors. They are designed
to increase consent rates for both deceased and live donation by cutting off
transplant tourism, incentivizing registration for deceased donation, and
removing disincentives for live donation. This review summarizes the unique
aspects of these laws and their preliminary impact in 2011.
II
A REVIEW OF RECENT ISRAELI LAWS RELATED TO ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION
A. The Brain-Respiratory Death Law
21

The first of these two laws, the Brain-Respiratory Death Law, represents a
consensus between the medical community and the religious authorities. It
22
defines the circumstances and mechanisms for determining brain death. These
include:
1. The mandatory performance of an apnea test according to established
guidelines, including the use of a continuous positive airway pressure system
where appropriate;
2. The mandatory performance of an ancillary test, using one of the
following modalities: transcranial Doppler; computed, tomographic
angiography; or auditory, brainstem-evoked potentials. Radionuclide
angiography, using hexamethylpropylene amine oxime single-photon emission
23
CT (SPECT), was included as an option for ancillary testing in 2011;
3. Informing next of kin when a patient is suspected of being brainrespiratory dead and inquiring whether the patient expressed an opinion, in
writing, regarding the determination of brain death. The provision requires that
these views be taken into consideration before performing formal brain-death
24
testing;
4. The establishment of an accreditation committee, comprising ten
members, including four physicians from various disciplines, three rabbis (one
20. Brain-Repository Death Law, 5768-2008, SH No. 2144 (Isr.), available at
http://www.knesset.gov.il/Laws/Data/law/2144/2144.pdf; The Organ Transplantation Law 5768-2008. SH
No. 2144 p. 394 (Isr.), available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/Laws/Data/law/2144/2144.pdf, translated in
Israel Transplant Law: Organ Transplant Act, 2008, The Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking
and Transplant Tourism (April 8, 2014, 2:29 PM), http://www.declarationofistanbul.org/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=267:israel-transplant-law-organ-transplant-act2008&catid=83:legislation&Itemid=130.
21. Brain-Repository Death Law at p. 406 (Isr.).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 406, 408.
24. Id. at 407.
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of them also a physician), an ethicist, a philosopher, and a lawyer;
5. The requirement for all physicians determining brain-respiratory death to
undergo a training course, the content of which is determined by the
26
accreditation committee.
In addition, when a patient makes his position against the determination of
brain death known to his relatives, he will not be disconnected from the
27
mechanical ventilator until his heart stops beating. All other therapy will be
28
discontinued.
B. The Organ Transplantation Law
29

The second of these two laws, the Organ Transplantation Law,
comprehensively defines all ethical, legal, and organizational aspects of organ
donation, allocation, and transplantation in Israel. First, the law declares
buying, selling, or brokering in organs a criminal offence punishable by three
years in jail and subject to a large fine, whether performed within or outside of
30
Israel. It also bans reimbursement for organ transplantation anywhere outside
of Israel if the procurement of the organ and its transplantation are performed
contrary to the law of either that country or Israel, rendering the law
31
extraterritorial.
A clause in the law gives priority to potential organ recipients who (1) are
registered as organ donors for at least three years prior to being listed as
candidates, (2) gave their consent for actual organ donation of their deceased
32
next-of-kin, or (3) are non-designated living kidney or liver-lobe donors. A
recent Parliamentary amendment gives priority to all living donors, non33
designated and designated alike, broadening the clause’s scope.
Finally, the law includes the following clauses that aim to remove
disincentives to living donation:
1. Fixed reimbursement equivalent to forty days of lost wages based on the
donor’s average income during the three months prior to donation (an
unemployed donor is reimbursed based upon the minimum salary in the market
34
at the time of donation);

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 407.
Id.
Id. at 408.
Id.
The Organ Transplantation Law at p. 394 (Isr.).
Id. at 404.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 396–97, 402.
GUIDELINES FOR ORGAN ALLOCATION OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE OF THE ISR. NAT’L
TRANSPLANT CENTER BASED UPON THE ORGAN TRANSPLANT LAW, 3286 available at
http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/EF3D9055-295C-4152-89C3-ADADBCC0C5D8/26789/6216.pdf.
34. Rules for Reimbursements of Live Organ Donors, ISRAELI MINISTER OF HEALTH (based upon
the Organ Transplantation Law), http://www.nevo.co.il/law_html_/Law06/tak-6917.pdf, at 1468 (last
visited Oct. 16, 2014).
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2. Reimbursement for travel expenses to and from the hospital for the donor
35
and his relatives during the entire hospitalization and follow-up period;
3. Reimbursement for seven days of recovery in a recuperation facility
36
within three months after donation;
4. Five years reimbursement for medical insurance, work-capability-loss
insurance, and life insurance, all to be reimbursed upon submission of
37
appropriate insurance policies and payment receipts; and
5. Reimbursement of five psychological consultations and treatments upon
38
submission of appropriate receipts.
Banning reimbursement for illegal transplant tourism went into effect in late
2008 shortly after this new law was passed. It took two more years for the INTC
to promulgate and implement the multitude of regulations stemming from these
39
two laws. Following an intensive year-long multilingual media campaign in
40
41
2011, the new laws were fully implemented in April 2012.
III
THE GOALS OF THE RECENT ISRAELI LAWS RELATED TO ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION
A. Increasing Consent Rate for Deceased Organ Donation by Resurrecting
the Reciprocal Altruism Principle
Organ donation in Israel has always been an opt-in model requiring the
42
donor’s explicit consent. The deceased’s relatives’ consent is always obtained
43
prior to organ procurement. Traditionally, signed donor cards were
interpreted as representing the donor’s written will, and therefore were almost
44
uniformly respected by relatives. The Organ Transplantation Law assumes
that donors’ next of kin will continue to honor that consent and therefore the
more individuals will opt in because of the priority given to registered donors,
the higher the number will be of actual consents for deceased organ donation.
The law provides an incentive for individuals to agree to help each other.
This incentive structure resembles naturally occurring “reciprocal altruism,”

35. Id. at 1469.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1468.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1468–69; see supra note 33, at 3286.
40. See, e.g., NAT’L TRANSPLANT CENTER, http://www.itc.gov.il/eng/index.html (last visited May
10, 2013).
41. 2012 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ISR. NAT’L TRANSPLANT CENTER, http://www.itc.gov.il/
news/news-06022013.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2014).
42. ISR, NAT’L TRANSPLANT CENTER, http://www.itc.gov.il/eng/merkaz.html (last visited Apr. 16,
2014).
43. Id.
44. Lavee, New Law, supra note 12, at 1131.
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defined by Trivers as “each partner helping the other while he helps himself.”
46
The altruist donor benefits because, in time, he “is helped in turn.”
Interestingly, Wilson and Wilson noted that “internally altruistic groups out47
compete selfish groups.”
The preliminary results show that the number of new registered donors per
month has significantly risen from a mean of 2889, from 1998–2010, to a
48
monthly mean of 6273 in 2011. This represents an increase in the total number
of registered donors from 10% of the adult population in 2010 to 12% in 2011
(95% confidence interval for the difference between the means 1113–5654, p =
49
0.007). The consent rate for organ donation from deceased donors increased to
54.9% in 2011 from 49.2% in 2010, although this increase is not statistically
50
significant (95% prediction interval 38.7–56.8, p = 0.11). However, the number
51
of deceased organ donors significantly increased from 60 in 2010 to 89 in 2011.
52
This is also a significant increase in comparison to the previous seven years.
Consequently, there is a significant increase in the deceased-organ-donation
53
rate, from 7.8 donors per million population in 2010 to 11.4 in 2011.
One question that, naturally, arises is whether statistical analysis and testing
is required at all for our data. After all, we have the full national population of
families asked to donate their loved ones’ organs after the declaration of brain
death. A simple comparison of consent rates between years might seem enough
to prove whether the consent rate has increased from 2010 to 2011. However,
we feel that this would be a narrow interpretation of the data. To formulate a
successful policy, we need to know whether the new law is expected to increase
the consent rate in the future. Although we know that the consent rate
increased from 2010 to 2011, we cannot necessarily extrapolate and make
predictions about the future, an essential concession when evaluating public
policy. We therefore prefer to view our data as a sample and not the full
population. The relevant period of consideration extends into the future, and,
every year, a certain value for the consent rate is realized based on a certain
statistical distribution. What we are interested in (and testing for using the
prediction-interval method) is whether that statistical distribution changes in
2011. If the probability of donation when a request is made is unchanged by the
law, then the law is not expected to bring any benefits, and the increase in 2011

45. Robert L. Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 35, 39 (1971).
46. Id.
47. David Sloan Wilson & Edward O. Wilson, Rethinking the Theoretical Foundation of
Sociobiology, 82 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 327, 328 (2007).
48. Jacob Lavee et al., Preliminary Marked Increase in the National Organ Donation Rate in Israel
Following Implementation of a New Organ Transplantation Law, 13 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 780,
781 (2013) [hereinafter Lavee, Preliminary Marked Increase].
49. Id.; see infra Figure 1.
50. Lavee, Preliminary Marked Increase, supra note 64, at 782; see infra Figure 1.
51. Lavee, Preliminary Marked Increase, supra note 64, at 781.
52. Id; see infra Figure 2A.
53. Lavee, Preliminary Marked Increase, supra note 64, at 781; see infra Figure 2B.
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could be a statistical accident.
54
As mentioned, the new law was enacted on March 2008, but the new
55
organ-allocation prioritization plan was not implemented until April 2012, and
therefore the increase observed in 2011 could be attributed to the year-long
56
public campaign that preceded it. It may be too early to attribute these
encouraging results to the prioritization policy. We expect, however, that once
the results are more widely publicized and understood by the public, the
consent rate will increase. As outlined in part IV of this article, we will continue
to monitor the effects of the new law.
The new prioritization policy is not purely altruistic because there is a quid
pro quo reward. Moreover, it violates the ideal of medical care being allocated
on the basis of medical need only, not other factors such as a patient’s ethnic
origin, wealth, or behavior. However, most people who sign an organ donor
card will never need an organ themselves, nor will they receive a material
reward for their promised donation. Therefore, they may not be purely
57
altruistic, but they remain predominantly altruistic.
Is it unfair to those “free riders” to prioritize other candidates who are
willing to donate over them? We hypothesize that true believers in the
immorality of organ donation after brain death would not be affected by the
new law. If organ donation after brain death is morally wrong, then it is morally
wrong for their potential organ recipients as well. Therefore, it would be
morally wrong for them to become candidates for organ transplantation and to
accept an organ. Respecting the religious freedom of those who become
candidates requires respecting their refusal to donate after death. But it does
not require giving them the same priority as those who are willing to donate.
They are still eligible for transplants, if needed, despite the “free riding” that
this entails, simply on the basis of their medical need and medicine’s
commitment to meeting patients’ needs. Moreover, if they were to be willing to
donate an organ while alive, to which they would have no objection, they would
be granted a level of priority in organ allocation equal to those who gave their
actual consent for the donation of the organs of their deceased next of kin. In
addition, if this new policy achieves the goal and produces sufficiently more
organs, everyone benefits. People who do not sign a donor card, although
58
disadvantaged, are better off than they would be without the policy.
59
The original version of the law was criticized for granting priority in organ
54. The Organ Transplantation Law 5768-2008. SH No. 2144 p. 394 (Isr.), available at
http://www.knesset.gov.il/Laws/Data/law/2144/2144.pdf (accessed May 10, 2013).
55. 2012 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ISR. NAT’L TRANSPLANT CENTER, supra note 53.
56. See infra Figure 1.
57. See generally, Jacob Lavee & Dan Brock, Prioritizing Registered Donors in Organ Allocation:
An Ethical Appraisal of the Israeli Organ Transplant Law, 18 CURRENT OPINION CRITICAL CARE 707
(2012) [hereinafter Lavee, Prioritizing Registered Donors].
58. Id. at 709.
59. Muireann Quigley et al., Organ Donation and Priority Points in Israel: An Ethical Analysis, 93
TRANSPLANTATION 970, 972 (2012).
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allocation to candidates who had previously donated an organ only to a non60
designated recipient, the so-called fully altruistic live-organ donation.
Parliament’s decision assumed that non-designated donation is substantially
more altruistic than designated donation to a relative or friend. However, as
designated living donors become an increasingly large source of organs, they
support the goal of increasing the organ supply and therefore deserve to be
61
prioritized. In opposition with this version, a special advisory committee
62
recommended giving priority to all living donors. The Israeli Parliament
recently amended this clause to grant priority to all living donors, both
63
designated and non-designated.
For years, the United Network for Organ Sharing has practiced a similar
policy, which gives all living donors priority to receive a transplant from a
64
deceased donor should they ever need one. A similar provision exists in the
organ-transplantation law in Singapore, in which any candidate for organ
transplantation who does not opt out of organ donation prior to being listed is
65
prioritized over candidates who opt out.
Kessler and Roth’s recent research strongly supports the prioritization
66
policy. Through a a laboratory experimental game, which examines how
various management strategies for organ-donation waiting lists impact the
process of deciding to register as an organ donor, they show that an organallocation policy giving priority on waiting lists to those who have previously
67
registered as donors has a significant positive impact on registration.
Kessler and Roth also find that the existence of a legal loophole completely
68
eliminates the increase in donation generated by the priority rule. Through the
loophole, an individual can register to receive priority but avoid donating by
69
providing his family with the option to decline donation. We share this concern
and will monitor it carefully by comparing the consent rate of families in which
the deceased has a donor card to the consent rate of families in which the
deceased has no donor card. The weighted average consent rate for people who
70
signed a card for 2002–2010 was 90.4%, whereas the weighted average consent
60. The Organ Transplantation Law 5768-2008. SH No. 2144 p. 396-397, 402 (Isr.), available at
http://www.knesset.gov.il/Laws/Data/law/2144/2144.pdf (accessed May 10, 2013).
61. Lavee, Prioritizing Registered Donors, supra note 57, at 710.
62. Lavee, New Law, supra note 12, at 1131.
63. Jacob Lavee, Ethical Amendments to the Israeli Organ Transplant Law, 13 AM. J.
TRANSPLANTATION 1614, 1614 (2013).
64. UNOS Policy 3.5.5.3: allocation of deceased kidneys (2008).
65. Human Organ Transplant Act (Ch. 131A, § 12(a)–(b) (Indon.).
66. Judd B. Kessler & Alvin E. Roth, Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate, 102
AM. ECON. REV. 2018, 2021 (2012).
67. Id.
68. Judd B. Kessler & Alvin E. Roth, Organ Donation Loopholes Undermine Warm Glow Giving:
An Experiment Motivated By Priority Loopholes in Israel, 21–22 (Feb. 23, 2013) (working paper),
available at http://www.gsm.pku.edu.cn/resource/uploadfiles/docs/20130313/201303131229496395.docx .
69. Id. at 4–6.
70. Unpublished internal data of the Israel National Transplant Center.
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71

rate for people who did not sign a card was 42%. In 2011, these consent rates
72
were 93% and 51%, respectively, so we see no signs of any decline. As data
accumulates, we will employ more rigorous statistical testing, and if adjustments
to the law need to be made, we will raise the issue with the relevant authorities.
Even if the prioritization approach results in higher consent rates, public
opposition is a relevant concern for the United States and other countries
considering implementing a similar policy. Robertson, Yokum, and Wright
73
report in this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems that, in experimental
settings, most U.S. study participants consider the reciprocal preferences
proposal efficacious in achieving a significant increase in organ donation yet of
low morality. However, a set group of policy reforms, which combine reciprocal
preferences, opt-out schemes, and elimination of the family veto, neutralize
moral objections to a policy that consists only of reciprocal preferences, which
suggests that this package of reforms may be politically feasible.
B. Stopping Transplant Tourism by Banning Reimbursement
The annual number of patients undergoing kidney transplantation abroad
has decreased from 155 in 2006 to thirty-five in 2011, based on data retrieved
74
from the Israeli National Dialysis Registry. This is likely due to the ban on
reimbursing patients for transplantations that are illegal in the host country.
Transplant tourism to traditional illegal venues, such as China, with its mostly
executed prisoner donors, and the Philippines, with its vendor living donors, has
75
stopped completely since the new law took effect. A few patients self-funded
their kidney transplantations performed abroad during 2011, but most Israeli
76
patients do not seek transplantation abroad if it is not reimbursed. Although
pre-dialytic patients seeking illegal kidney transplantations abroad might not be
registered with the Israeli National Dialysis Registry, all Israeli dialytic patients
must register, and therefore, their transplantation is always documented
regardless of where it is performed. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the
significant reduction in observed kidney transplantations abroad is not
artificially high by failing to account for a significant increase in illegal, selffunded transplant tourism.
C. Increasing Live Kidney Donation by Removing Disincentives
In parallel to the significant decrease in transplant tourism from Israel, local
living kidney donation has significantly increased from seventy-one in 2010 to

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Christopher T. Robertson et al., Perceptions of Efficacy, Morality, and Politics of Potential
Cadaveric Organ Transplantation Reforms. 77 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2014 at 101.
74. Lavee, Preliminary Marked Increase, supra note 48, at 782; see infra Figure 3A.
75. See, e.g., Padilla et al., supra note 13.
76. See Lavee, Preliminary Marked Increase, supra note 48, at 782.
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77

117 in 2011. It is hard to ascertain whether this is the result of the dwindling
opportunities to receive a kidney abroad or due to the removal of disincentives
for local living donation. Regardless, the end result is a marked increase in the
number of living kidney donations.
Overall, the significant increase in 2011 in organ transplantations, both from
deceased and living donors, has resulted, for the first time in a decade, in a
decrease in the number of candidates awaiting organ transplantation and the
78
number of potential recipients who die on the waiting list.
D. The Declaration of Istanbul and the Self Sufficiency Goal
The Israeli Parliament approved the new Israeli Organ Transplantation Law
one month before representatives from seventy-eight countries around the
79
world formalized the Declaration of Istanbul. However, it follows the
Declaration’s principles almost verbatim. The fundamental goal of the
Declaration is that each nation should “strive to achieve self-sufficiency in
organ donation by providing a sufficient number of organs for residents in need
80
from within the country.” Banning reimbursement for illegal transplant
tourism, combined with the other measures aimed at increasing local deceased
and living donation, is a signal of success. It also addresses the recent call for
81
governments’ self-sufficiency in organ donation and transplantation.
IV
FUTURE RESEARCH
Although the 2011 increase in organ donations in Israel is encouraging, the
results are still preliminary and more work needs to be done to better evaluate
the long-term implications of the new law. We will undertake the following
additional research projects.
First, we will keep collecting data and reevaluate annually whether the
increase in organ donations in 2011 was temporary or permanent.
Second, a more thorough analysis of the reasons behind the 2011 increase in
organ donation may be useful. Organ donations may have increased for many
reasons, such as an increase in the supply of potential donors, an increase in the
consent rate as a result of the public campaign, or as a result of the incentives
offered by the new law.
Third, a subject of critical importance to the successful implementation of
77. Lavee, Preliminary Marked Increase, supra note 48, at 782; see Figure 3B.
78. Id.
79. Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism and Commercialism: The Declaration of Istanbul,
LANCET, Jul. 5, 2008, at 5; the Organ Transplantation Law 5768-2008. SH No. 2144 p. 394 (Isr.),
available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/Laws/Data/law/2144/2144.pdf (accessed May 10, 2013).
80. Principles, DECLARATION OF ISTANBUL ON ORGAN TRAFFICKING AND TRANSPLANT
TOURISM,
http://www.declarationofistanbul.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&
id=82&Itemid=86 (last visited Feb. 5, 2014).
81. See, e.g., Francis L. Delmonico et al., A Call for Government Accountability to Achieve
National Self-sufficiency in Organ Donation and Transplantation, 378 LANCET 1414, 1417 (2011).
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similar programs is whether they constitute a Pareto improvement, or whether
people who do not sign a donor card are worse off because of the program.
Clearly, people who have a donor card are better off because there are more
organs to be allocated and they have higher priority than before signing. On the
other hand, people who do not have a donor card gain from the increased
supply of organs, but may be worse off overall if the effect of having lower
priority on the waiting list outweighs the benefits of the higher organ supplies.
We will observe the outcomes of candidates for organ transplantation with and
without donor cards before and after the implementation of the law. In
addition, we will analyze the issue of the optimal prioritization scheme. On the
one hand, prioritization needs to be substantial enough to cause an increased
number of signatures. On the other hand, it also needs to prevent a significant
increase in mortality rates of candidates on the waiting lists who have not signed
the donor card.
Finally, analyzing different countries can be useful to predict whether
similar programs may be effective in other countries, like the United States.
Israel is somewhat unique because it contains groups who are strongly against
organ donation and not likely to respond to incentives. Similar programs may
be more effective elsewhere. On the other hand, the higher percentage of
donor-card signers in other countries and the higher consent rate suggest that
there is less room for improvement in other countries, limiting the potential
response to the program. Such factors need to be carefully examined,
potentially with public-opinion surveys.
V
SUMMARY
Changing national attitudes toward organ donation is daunting and timeconsuming. The two new Israeli laws were created in response to various
obstacles to organ donation. The early results appear promising and suggest the
measures were effective. Time will tell whether the organ donation rate in Israel
will increase enough to deal with the increasing number of candidates for organ
transplantation. Meanwhile, applying these policy measures more universally
may be considered.

82. Pareto efficiency is a term commonly used in economics. It means that it is not possible to
improve the situation of one person without hurting someone else. A Pareto improvement is an action
that improves the situation of someone without hurting somebody else. The advantage in focusing on
Pareto efficiency is that no one should object to actions that constitute a Pareto improvement, although
comparisons between different Pareto-efficient allocations necessarily involve weighing the utility of
certain individuals against others (because, if the economy is at a Pareto-efficient point, moving it to
another point will make some individuals better off but hurt others).
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Figure 1: Cumulative number of registered donors by the end of each and the
11
annual consent rate for deceased organ donation (in percent).

Figure 2
11
A. Annual number of deceased organ donors.
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11

B. Annual deceased organ donation rate (pmp – per million population).

Figure 3
11
A. Annual number of kidney transplantations performed abroad.
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11

B. Annual number of kidney transplantations from living donors.

